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AVOIDING PERMANENT LIMBO:                     
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE ELABORATION 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FROM SAUCIER 
TO CAMRETA (AND BEYOND) 
Michael T. Kirkpatrick* & Joshua Matz**
 
 
[A] “longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid 
reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding 
them.” . . .  But we have long recognized that this day may never come—
that our regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified 
immunity situation because it threatens to leave standards of official 
conduct permanently in limbo.1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Articles contending that the U.S. Supreme Court has reached a 
fundamentally correct and defensible formulation of controversial doctrine 
are few and far between.  Even as calls for dramatic departures, new 
constitutional rights, and the abandonment of precedent echo across law 
reviews, self-styled defenses of the status quo remain noticeably less 
common.  Yet that is what we undertake in this Article:  a survey and 
defense of the Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence from Saucier v. 
Katz2
Qualified immunity doctrine has undergone a series of marked 
transformations over the past few decades.  One of the most important 
 to Camreta v. Greene that proposes only minor reforms to an 
otherwise well-functioning procedural framework.  Our view is born of the 
conviction that recent cases have achieved a desirable balance amongst 
competing considerations of fairness, efficiency, and the need to refine 
constitutional law.  It is also born of fear that some of the Court’s more 
conservative members may soon imperil this compromise.  Refinement, not 
redesign, is the best path forward for the Court’s qualified immunity 
jurisprudence.  In this Article, we defend that claim, offer a reform proposal 
focused on structuring discretion, and criticize a recent push by several 
members of the Court to chart a more radical course. 
 
*  Attorney, Public Citizen Litigation Group; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University 
Law Center.  B.A., 1987, Texas Christian University; J.D., 1991, American University, 
Washington College of Law.  
**  B.A., 2008, University of Pennsylvania; MSt., 2009, Oxford University; J.D. Candidate 
2012, Harvard Law School. 
 1. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2024 (2011) (internal citation omitted). 
 2. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
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developments has involved the law governing judicial discretion to 
determine the merits of a constitutional claim even where the defendant 
enjoys qualified immunity.  Encouraged by Siegert v. Gilley3 and then 
mandated by Saucier, this procedure ensures that the constitutional 
regulations governing public officials remain fine-tuned through ongoing 
elaboration—thereby averting the stagnation that might occur if findings of 
qualified immunity prevented constitutional rulings.  However, a judicial 
and scholarly backlash against Saucier’s mandatory “order of battle” 
prompted the Court to unanimously reverse itself just eight years later in 
Pearson v. Callahan.4  Pearson announced a grant of total discretion to 
lower courts in deciding whether to reach the constitutional merits after 
finding qualified immunity.5  Then, just two years later, the Court 
suggested in Camreta that Pearson had actually imposed a set of limits on 
lower court discretion to reach the merits grounded in its criticism of 
Saucier.6  More dramatically, Camreta announced an exception to the 
Court’s practice of not considering appeals by prevailing parties, thus 
allowing officials to appeal adverse constitutional rulings issued alongside 
judgment in their favor on qualified immunity grounds.7  However, in that 
same case, three Justices announced serious discontent with the current 
procedural regime and indicated their willingness to consider removing 
Pearson discretion altogether.8
Emphasizing the need to balance a complex set of policy objectives in 
crafting qualified immunity jurisprudence, we survey recent developments, 
assess critiques leveled against the status quo, and offer a reform proposal 
aimed at resolving the problem of strategic judging, which we consider the 
most significant outstanding concern in this area of law.  Because Camreta 
successfully addresses several forceful criticisms of post-Pearson doctrine, 
it plays a particularly important role in our discussion.  Camreta is also 
significant because Justice Scalia’s concurrence and Justice Kennedy’s 
dissenting opinion augur trouble for the future of constitutional tort law.  
Linking their call for removal of Pearson discretion to larger trends in 
recent conservative jurisprudence, we criticize the restrictions contemplated 
in their opinions and explain why alleged alternative vehicles for the 
elaboration of constitutional rights are ultimately inadequate to the task. 
  Thus, there is no end in sight to the debates 
that have kept qualified immunity doctrine in a state of flux. 
This Article unfolds in three Parts.  Part I begins by tracing the 
development of qualified immunity doctrine from Harlow to Pearson, 
pivoting around the Court’s creation of a mandatory scheme in Saucier and 
subsequent retreat in Pearson.  It then surveys criticisms of post-Pearson 
doctrine.  Whereas we find objections grounded in the avoidance canon, 
anti-advisory opinion norms, and the creation of bad law unpersuasive, we 
 
 3. 500 U.S. 226 (1991). 
 4. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 5. Id. at 236. 
 6. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 7. Id. at 2028–29. 
 8. Id. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2043–45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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see merit in critiques emphasizing confusion of the dicta/precedent 
boundary, the need to permit appellate review of constitutional 
determinations (“reviewability”), and the dangers of strategic behavior by 
parties and judges.  Part I concludes in 2009, pointing to the need for 
reforms that address these three issues. 
Part II opens with Camreta, briefly explaining its facts and holdings 
before evaluating its success as a cure for the problem of reviewability.  
Although we recognize that Camreta’s authorization of prevailing party 
review in qualified immunity cases is no silver bullet, we conclude that it 
effectively resolves the problem of reviewability, and propose an extension 
to en banc procedures that might further effectuate its remedial potential.  
Part II then delivers mixed news, noting that the Court has brought 
welcome clarity to the dicta/precedent boundary in qualified immunity 
cases, but that the serious problem of strategic behavior survives Camreta.  
We conclude this part by discussing a potential new problem created by 
Camreta involving the financial incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
ultimately dismissing this concern as trivial in practice and concurring with 
Professor Nancy Leong’s more radical suggestion regarding Camreta’s 
implications for the future of fee-shifting in qualified immunity cases. 
Part III opens on a darker note.  Identifying cause for concern in 
Camreta, especially when contrasted with Pearson, we show that several 
Justices are contemplating the radical step of eliminating Pearson’s grant of 
discretion to reach the merits of the constitutional question after finding 
qualified immunity.  Linking this possibility to a larger conservative desire 
to constrict constitutional rights and disable private attorneys general, we 
conclude that Pearson does not stand on sufficiently secure ground.  
Opposed to such a break from precedent, we explain that the alternative 
vehicles for elaborating constitutional law identified in Justice Kennedy’s 
dissent—municipal liability, suppression hearings, and declaratory and 
injunctive relief—would fail to achieve the crucial goal of refining 
constitutional law.  Turning back to our own reform project, we then 
conclude by suggesting that the problem of strategic behavior is best 
addressed through a standard that structures discretion and permits review 
(under an abuse of discretion standard) of the choice to make a 
constitutional determination after finding qualified immunity. 
The Court’s efforts to avoid permanent limbo have proven largely 
successful.  A few minor reforms to current procedure would go a long way 
toward securing the legitimacy and practical workability of qualified 
immunity doctrine.  This approach is better than one that places the 
refinement of constitutional rights in jeopardy by trusting deceptively 
inadequate alternative dynamics.  The difference is not merely academic.  
When rules governing official behavior are trapped in limbo, the vulnerable 
and defenseless amongst us bear the terrible costs of failure to manifest our 
constitutional ideals in rules that thwart petty tyrants. 
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I.  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM HARLOW TO PEARSON 
The doctrine of qualified immunity, and in particular the appropriate 
structure for analyzing immunity claims, developed in a series of Supreme 
Court decisions over the last two decades.  In this part, we quickly 
summarize the development of this doctrine from Harlow to Saucier, and 
describe the criticisms of Saucier that drove the Court’s decision in 
Pearson.  We then evaluate numerous criticisms of qualified immunity 
doctrine, dismissing those that are unpersuasive in light of Pearson, and 
explaining in greater detail the three most serious challenges that remained 
after that ruling was handed down in 2009. 
A.  Harlow to Saucier 
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil 
damages unless an official’s conduct violates a “clearly established” 
constitutional right.9  This potent doctrine, which is regularly invoked by 
officials accused of a constitutional tort, confers “immunity from suit rather 
than a mere defense to liability.”10  Historically, the doctrine of qualified, or 
good-faith, immunity developed from an attempt to balance the need for a 
damages remedy to discourage unconstitutional conduct against the need to 
protect public officials from liability in situations where the law is not clear 
and the threat of liability might otherwise inhibit lawful action.11  Thus, in 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that “government officials performing 
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”12  Harlow took a major step toward developing the basic 
framework of modern qualified immunity doctrine by elaborating an 
objective test that dispensed with a requirement of subjective “good 
faith.”13
In Siegert v. Gilley, the Court took up this task and sought “to clarify the 
analytical structure under which a claim of qualified immunity should be 
addressed.”
  However, for almost a full decade after Harlow, the Court 
declined to specify a precise test for finding qualified immunity. 
14  It held that the first inquiry is “whether the plaintiff has 
asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all,” reasoning that such a 
determination is “concomitant to the determination of whether the 
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff [was] ‘clearly established’ at the 
time the defendant acted.”15
 
 9. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
  The Court suggested, with little explanation, 
 10. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 11. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 815–16 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504–08 
(1978)). 
 12. Id. at 818. 
 13. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment:  An Empirical 
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 671–72 (2009). 
 14. 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). 
 15. Id. at 232. 
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that it was desirable to address the merits of the constitutional claim before 
assessing whether the right was clearly established at the time of the 
challenged conduct.16  Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but 
noted his disagreement with the Court’s suggestion that the constitutional 
question should have been decided, explaining that “[t]he Court of Appeals 
adopted the altogether normal procedure of deciding the case before it on 
the ground that appeared to offer the most direct and appropriate 
resolution,” and that “it seems to reverse the usual ordering of issues to tell 
the trial and appellate courts that they should resolve the constitutional 
question first.”17
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
 
18 the Court explained in greater detail 
the rationale for its conclusion in Siegert that “the better approach to 
resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to 
determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a 
constitutional right at all,” and only then to consider whether the right “was 
clearly established at the time of the events in question.”19  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Souter explained that the “generally sound” rule of 
constitutional avoidance does not readily fit the qualified immunity context 
because the court must still make “some determination about the state of 
constitutional law at the time the officer acted.”20  More significant, 
according to the majority, is the potential that avoidance of rulings on the 
merits in favor of rulings on qualified immunity could impede the 
development of constitutional doctrine unless the issue arose in a context 
where qualified immunity is not available.21  Justice Stevens concurred in 
the judgment, but expressed the view that it would be wiser to adhere to the 
policy of constitutional avoidance and leave the development of new 
constitutional doctrines to circumstances where qualified immunity does 
not apply.22  Justice Breyer concurred in both the judgment and opinion, but 
wrote separately to agree with Justice Stevens that Siegert “should not be 
read to deny lower courts the flexibility, in appropriate cases, to decide 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims on the basis of qualified immunity, and thereby 
avoid wrestling with constitutional issues that are either difficult or poorly 
presented.”23
To the extent that there was any confusion about whether Siegert 
required, or merely suggested, a merits-first approach in qualified immunity 
cases, the issue was resolved in Saucier v. Katz.  In Saucier, the Supreme 
Court held that in a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a 
constitutional right, the two aspects of a qualified immunity defense must 
 
 
 16. Id. at 233. 
 17. Id. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 18. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 19. Id. at 841 n.5 (citing Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. (citing Stephen J. Shapiro, Public Officials’ Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 
Actions Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald and its Progeny, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 265 
n.109 (1989)). 
 22. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 23. Id. at 858–59 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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be considered in a particular sequence.24  First, the court must decide 
whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show that the officer’s conduct 
violated a constitutional right.25  Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied the 
first step, the court must decide whether the right was clearly established, 
such that a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct was 
unlawful.26
The Court explained that it was mandating this order of inquiry to 
encourage the development and elaboration of constitutional law.  “[W]ere 
a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly 
established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of 
the case,” explained Justice Kennedy, the law might be deprived of an 
explanation as to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right.
 
27
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred in the 
judgment, but not in the mandatory two-step inquiry imposed upon lower 
courts.
 
28  The Ginsburg concurrence warned that the mandatory two-part 
sequence had the “potential to confuse,” and pointed out that the majority, 
by deciding Saucier on the clearly established prong without reaching the 
merits prong, had done what it was ordering the lower courts not to do.29
B.  Pearson and the Retreat from Saucier’s Mandatory Order of Battle 
  
This observation foreshadowed a turbulent future for Saucier’s mandatory 
order of battle in qualified immunity litigation. 
The sequential qualified immunity inquiry mandated by Saucier was 
roundly criticized.  The courts of appeals crafted broad exceptions to 
Saucier’s mandate and occasionally engaged in outright defiance of its 
required sequencing.30  Prominent circuit judges sharply criticized Saucier 
in public lectures and published opinions,31 and several Justices expressed 
serious reservations in concurring opinions and dissents from denial of 
certiorari.32
 
 24. 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
  Thus, it was no surprise when the Supreme Court’s grant of 
 25. Id. at 201. 
 26. Id. at 201–02. 
 27. Id. at 201. 
 28. Id. at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 29. Id. at 210–13. 
 30. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009) (collecting cases). 
 31. See, e.g., Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 622 (7th Cir. 2008) (“This ‘rigid order of 
battle’ has been criticized on practical, procedural, and substantive grounds.”); Lyons v. City 
of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 580–85 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“I cannot resist 
adding still another separate writing in this case that questions the rigidity of this 
requirement.  While I see the virtue in telling lower courts that they should generally answer 
the constitutional question before the clearly established question, I wonder whether it makes 
sense to mandate that they do so in all cases, no matter the costs, no matter the ease with 
which the second question might be answered.”); Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the 
Constitution:  Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006). 
 32. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 430 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The relative ease with which we could decide this 
case on the qualified immunity ground, and thereby avoid deciding a far more difficult 
constitutional question, underscores the need to lift the rigid ‘order of battle’ decision-
making requirement that this Court imposed upon lower courts in Saucier v. Katz.”); Los 
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certiorari in Pearson v. Callahan was accompanied by directions to address 
the question whether Saucier should be overruled. 
In Pearson, Justice Alito’s unanimous opinion acknowledged many of 
the criticisms that had been leveled at Saucier’s mandatory order of battle.  
For example, the Court recognized the burden on judicial resources 
occasioned by requiring the resolution of “difficult questions that have no 
effect on the outcome of the case.”33  Relatedly, it noted that “[a]dherence 
to Saucier’s two-step protocol departs from the general rule of 
constitutional avoidance.”34  Further, the Court agreed that “[u]nnecessary 
litigation of constitutional issues also wastes the parties’ resources.”35  
Indeed, as the Court explained, strict adherence to Saucier often fails to 
establish meaningful constitutional precedent because the decisions are too 
fact-bound to provide meaningful guidance, the issue is already pending 
before a higher court, or the constitutional decision rests on an 
interpretation of state law.36  Similarly, the Court observed that when a 
court is called upon to determine qualified immunity at the pleading stage, 
the facts may be too undeveloped to provide an adequate basis for resolving 
the constitutional question.37  The Court also recognized that “the first step 
of the Saucier procedure may create a risk of bad decision making,”38 
whether because of poor briefing of the constitutional issues or because of a 
judicial tendency to provide less attention to issues that will not affect the 
final judgment in a case.39
Justice Alito further emphasized that, in light of the general rule that a 
party may not appeal from a favorable judgment, a decision adverse to the 
defendant on the constitutional question might be insulated from review 
where the defendant is granted qualified immunity because the law was not 
clearly established at the time of the violation.
 
40
 
Angeles Cnty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 616–17 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“I would . . . disavow the unwise practice of deciding constitutional questions in 
advance of the necessity for doing so.”); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., concurring); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 387–88 (2007) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (describing the “highly fact-dependent nature of this constitutional 
determination,” arguing that this “fact dependency supports the argument that we should 
overrule the [Saucier’s order of battle] requirement,” and noting that “commentators, judges, 
and, in this case, 28 States in an amicus brief have invited us to reconsider Saucier’s 
requirement”); Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1019 (2004) (Stevens, J., denying 
certiorari) (criticizing this “unwise judge-made rule under which courts must decide whether 
the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation before addressing the question whether the 
defendant state actor is entitled to qualified immunity”). 
  A defendant in this 
scenario, as the prevailing party, might not be entitled to appeal the adverse 
 33. 555 U.S. at 224. 
 34. Id. at 241. 
 35. Id. at 237. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 238–39. 
 38. Id. at 239. 
 39. Id. at 225. 
 40. Id. at 240 (“Rigid adherence to the Saucier rule may make it hard for affected parties 
to obtain appellate review of constitutional decisions that may have a serious prospective 
effect on their operations.”). 
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holding on the constitutional question, even though that holding may have a 
prospective effect on the defendant.41
Having established a formidable case against Saucier’s mandatory 
sequencing, the Court reversed its earlier opinion and held that “[b]ecause 
the two-step Saucier procedure is often, but not always, advantageous, the 
judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals are in the best position 
to determine the order of decisionmaking [that] will best facilitate the fair 
and efficient disposition of each case.”
 
42
The Court was careful to acknowledge arguments for maintaining 
Saucier’s required sequence, and struck a balance by observing that, 
although it was withdrawing the mandate, Saucier’s procedure remains 
available as a matter of judicial discretion.
 
43  Indeed, Justice Alito 
emphasized that the Saucier protocol is often beneficial, especially where a 
discussion of the merits of the constitutional claim is useful to a 
determination of whether the right was clearly established.44  He then added 
that “the Saucier Court was certainly correct in noting that the two-step 
procedure promotes the development of constitutional precedent and is 
especially valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently arise in 
cases in which a qualified immunity defense is unavailable.”45  In such 
situations, he explained, the Saucier procedure may be the only effective 
way to prevent repeated unconstitutional conduct from evading judicial 
review.46
By abandoning the Saucier mandate while maintaining its availability as 
a matter of discretion, Pearson struck an important balance.  However, 
Pearson did not end the debate or resolve all the potential complications 
attendant to the Court’s qualified immunity doctrine.  As we explain below, 
scholarly battles persisted over the legitimacy and practical desirability of 
constitutional rulings issued despite a finding of immunity, as well as the 
new dangers posed by unstructured, unreviewable Pearson discretion. 
 
In the next section, we summarize concerns grounded in legitimacy and 
pragmatics, ultimately dismissing many of the most common criticisms of 
post-Saucier qualified immunity doctrine as unpersuasive in light of the 
Court’s reasoning in Pearson.  In the section following that, we argue that 
the most potent criticisms of qualified immunity doctrine after Pearson 
centered on the potential unreviewability of constitutional determinations, a 
hazy dicta/precedent boundary, and the related issue of a lack of clear 
standards governing decisions whether to reach the constitutional question 
in a particular case.  After Pearson, these features of qualified immunity 
doctrine invited—or at least permitted—strategic behavior by courts 
interested in developing constitutional doctrine in one direction or another. 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 242. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 236. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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C.  Red Herrings:  Avoidance, Advisory Opinions, and Bad Law 
In this section, we summarize and evaluate some of the most common 
criticisms of recent qualified immunity doctrine.  These critiques, familiar 
from Justice Alito’s opinion in Pearson, include alleged violation of 
constitutional avoidance norms, impermissible issuance of advisory 
opinions, and judging under conditions highly conducive to the creation of 
“bad” constitutional law.  Upon close inspection, we find that these 
challenges are largely unpersuasive—particularly post-Pearson—and 
therefore dismiss them as unimportant to the remainder of our evaluation of 
the Court’s recent jurisprudence. 
1.  Constitutional Avoidance 
The argument from constitutional avoidance, as articulated by Justice 
Breyer in Scott v. Harris to criticize Saucier, invokes “that older, wiser 
judicial counsel ‘not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless 
such adjudication is unavoidable.’”47  The basic intuition here is that judges 
ought not reach difficult constitutional questions when doing so is not 
necessary to the disposition of a case.  If applied in a principled and 
consistent manner by the Court, this objection might carry great force.  
However, as Lisa Kloppenberg has demonstrated, the Court’s invocations 
of avoidance doctrine hardly represent a model of consistency.48  More 
importantly, avoidance is not a per se good.  Rather, it reflects policy goals 
that are “especially weak in constitutional tort law.”49  Substantial analysis 
of the constitutional merits is often necessary for the immunity 
determination anyway,50 and the targets of actions brought under § 1983 
and Bivens are typically street-level bureaucrats whose “policy choices” do 
not forcefully implicate the separation of powers, friction-reduction, or 
deference to democratic outcome concerns that are commonly invoked in 
support of constitutional avoidance.51
2.  Advisory Opinions 
 
A related criticism, leveled most forcefully by Professor Thomas Healy, 
characterizes post-immunity merits rulings as illegitimate advisory opinions 
whose issuance is inconsistent with norms of proper adjudication.52
 
 47. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) (omission in 
original) (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)). 
  This 
objection is lacking on two grounds.  First, unlike classic advisory opinions, 
merits rulings in qualified immunity cases are grounded in real facts 
 48. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 1003, 
1028–35 (1994). 
 49. Michael L. Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU 
L. REV. 1539, 1543, 1547–58 (2007). 
 50. Id. at 1556–57. 
 51. Id. at 1557–58. 
 52. See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
847, 853, 910–15 (2005) (“The rise of unnecessary constitutional rulings is in significant 
tension with the long-established premises of federal court jurisdiction.”). 
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supporting an allegation of injury and request for damages.53  Far removed 
from the unwelcome specter of a judge sitting in chambers, opining on a 
string of hypotheticals without facts to provide substance to abstraction, 
qualified immunity adjudications bear little resemblance to the paradigm 
cases of impermissible advisory opinions.54  Second, as Professor Jack 
Beermann explains, strict application of the advisory opinion objection 
“would call into question such well-established practices as the inclusion in 
opinions of alternative holdings, the resolution of the merits in harmless 
error cases, and the flexible mootness doctrine which allows courts to 
decide moot cases that are ‘capable of repetition yet evading review.’”55
3.  Creating Bad Law 
  
Given that such a dramatic and across-the-board departure from norms of 
judicial practice would be unwise, there is little reason to suddenly apply a 
strict anti-advisory norm here, particularly in light of how far qualified 
immunity cases rest from the core of undesirable advisory adjudication.  
Commentators have also expressed concern that merits rulings will tend 
to produce bad law due to lack of adverseness, poor briefing, or careless 
judging.56  These claims, many of which originate from the Saucier regime, 
rest on dubious assumptions about litigation strategy and judicial practice.  
The “concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon 
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions”57
 
 53. See Note, Advisory Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over American 
Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2064, 2064–69 (2011) (discussing the origin of the 
Court’s practice of avoiding advisory opinions). 
 is generated by parties who have every incentive 
to litigate all issues fully.  After all, it is not as though a court first finds 
immunity and then calls for supplemental briefing to assist the 
constitutional determination—rather, the merits are reached alongside 
immunity in real cases involving alleged injuries and adverse parties, one of 
 54. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 
1004–05 (1924) (“The vice of the proposal, variously made, that opinions of the Supreme 
Court in advance of legislation would be ‘constructive,’ lies in the assumption, too often 
made by American political scientists, that constitutionality is a fixed quantity. . . .  Concepts 
like ‘liberty’ and ‘due process’ are too vague in themselves to solve issues.  They derive 
meaning only if referred to adequate human facts.  Facts and facts again are decisive.  They 
are either present-day facts, or ancient facts clothed by the universalizing instinct of man to 
look like principles. . . .  The reports furnish too abundant illustrations of what Huxley called 
the tragedy of a fact killing a theory.”). 
 55. See Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 
SUP. CT. REV. 139, 154.  
 56. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 52, at 910–15 (“A critical question, therefore, is whether 
the existence of a concrete dispute in a particular context will provide the parties with 
adequate incentives to argue vigorously the constitutional issue.  In harmless error and 
Fourth Amendment good faith cases, as in cases under the State Grounds doctrine, the 
answer would seem to be yes. . . .  But the same is not true in qualified immunity and habeas 
cases.”); Leval, supra note 31, at 1277–81 (“[T]he Supreme Court now requires that courts 
glibly announce new constitutional rights in dictum that will have no effect whatsoever on 
the case.  The practice will inevitably produce bad constitutional law.”). 
 57. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
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whom must brief the constitutional merits to prevail and the other of whom 
would be taking an astonishing gamble in declining to respond.  Indeed, as 
Dean John C. Jeffries, Jr., notes, “it would require otherworldly confidence 
for a defense attorney to duck an opportunity to contest the merits of a 
constitutional claim on the ground that her client was certain to win under 
qualified immunity, given that qualified immunity depends on the 
uncertainty of those same merits.”58  Such strategy would be especially 
nonsensical because defendants are often indemnified by the government 
and counseled by government attorneys whose role as repeat players 
provides a strong incentive to address the general development of 
constitutional tort law.59  Similarly, whereas Judge Pierre Leval imagines 
judges “glibly” discovering (or denying) rights,60
Although these considerations have been cited by numerous scholars and 
Justices as criticism of the Saucier protocol, we find them unpersuasive as 
criticism of Pearson.  This does not mean that we see only perfection in the 
status quo.  To the contrary, we believe that post-Pearson qualified 
immunity doctrine suffered from three major flaws.  We explore these flaws 
in the next section, and then argue in Part II that the Court’s opinion in 
Camreta v. Greene is best understood as a largely effective response to two 
of our concerns. 
 it is unclear why judges 
thoroughly briefed on the merits and aware of the functionally precedential 
effect of their decisions would be uniquely careless.  In any event, this 
argument has lost much of its force following Pearson because a judge who 
has chosen to reach the merits has decided, for one reason or another, to 
accept the costs, burdens, and responsibilities of adjudicating a 
constitutional issue. 
D.  The Real Difficulties:  Dicta, Reviewability, and Strategic Judging 
Whereas the criticisms of qualified immunity doctrine in the previous 
section do not, in our opinion, carry great force, especially after Pearson, 
three other lines of argument raise more difficult challenges to the 
framework of post-Pearson qualified immunity doctrine.  One argument 
emphasizes the unreviewability of merits determinations on appeal, another 
seeks to patrol the dicta/precedent boundary, and the third invokes fear of 
strategic judging.  These problems, moreover, are related—the treatment of 
merits determinations as dicta partially explains their perceived 
 
 58. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. 
CT. REV. 115, 130 (emphasis in original). 
 59. See George A. Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1188–89 (1977) (discussing statutes requiring indemnification of 
officials and requiring government to provide officials with legal defense by government 
attorneys); David F. Hamilton, The Importance and Overuse of Policy and Custom Claims:  
A View from One Trench, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 723, 730–31 (1999) (discussing 
indemnification of city employees in civil rights cases); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the 
Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 49–50 (1998) (“Very generally, a 
suit against a state officer is functionally a suit against the state, for the state defends the 
action and pays any adverse judgment.”). 
 60. Leval, supra note 31, at 1268. 
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unreviewability on appeal, which in turn incentivizes strategic behavior by 
allowing standardless discretion and prohibiting review of the resultant 
constitutional law.  In this section, we further explain each of these 
concerns, sketching the outline of this tripartite challenge to qualified 
immunity doctrine as it stood in 2009. 
1.  The Dicta/Precedent Distinction 
In 2006, Judge Pierre Leval delivered a high-profile lecture at New York 
University School of Law in which he asserted that courts confuse dicta 
with precedent in qualified immunity cases.61  The thrust of his argument 
was that merits rulings are not necessary to judgment and must therefore be 
non-binding dicta, yet those same rulings are nevertheless treated as 
something closer to precedent when they are held to have provided 
sufficiently clear notice to forestall future invocation of qualified 
immunity.62  Conceding that “dicta often serve extremely valuable 
purposes,” Judge Leval insisted that “[w]hat is problematic is not the 
utterance of dicta, but the failure to distinguish between holding and 
dictum.”63  The result of such confusion is “the creation of bad 
constitutional law,” since “courts are more likely to exercise flawed, ill-
considered judgment, more likely to overlook salutary cautions and 
contraindications, more likely to pronounce flawed rules, when uttering 
dicta than when deciding their cases.”64
2.  Unreviewability 
  Although we have already 
explained our skepticism of the claim that “bad law” is more likely in 
merits holdings secondary to findings of qualified immunity, we see the 
current force of Judge Leval’s objection as residing in his observation that 
uncertainty about the boundary between precedent and dicta can create 
jurisprudential confusion—as witnessed, for example, in the problem of 
unreviewability. 
Perhaps the most serious problem with post-Pearson doctrine consisted 
of defendants’ perceived inability to appeal adverse constitutional 
determinations if they won judgment on qualified immunity grounds.  Such 
appeals were understood to be prohibited because it is well established that 
parties cannot appeal dicta, and merits rulings in qualified immunity 
cases—which occupied an ambiguous space between dicta and precedent—
were thought to fall on the “dicta” side of this line for purposes of appellate 
review.65
 
 61. See generally id. 
  Such appeals were also perceived to conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s norm of only granting certiorari petitions from parties who suffered 
 62. See id. at 1275–82. 
 63. Id. at 1253. 
 64. Id. at 1255. 
 65. See id. at 1279 (“A further problem lies in the fact, as we discussed before, that there 
is no appeal from the trial court’s declaration in dictum that the officer’s conduct violated the 
Constitution—nor from the appeals court’s dictum.”). 
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adverse judgment below.  Justice Scalia recognized this dilemma in a 
dissent from the denial of certiorari in Bunting v. Mellen, arguing that “this 
general rule should not apply where a favorable judgment on qualified-
immunity grounds would deprive a party of an opportunity to appeal the 
unfavorable (and often more significant) constitutional determination.”66  
This proposal was justified, he added, because “[t]hat constitutional 
determination is not mere dictum in the ordinary sense, since the whole 
reason we require it to be set forth (despite the availability of qualified 
immunity) is to clarify the law and thus make unavailable repeated claims 
of qualified immunity in future cases.”67  Commentators agreed that 
reviewability presented a major issue, noting that it unfairly denied 
defendants an opportunity to appeal adverse dicta that effectively 
functioned as precedent.68
3.  Strategic Judging 
  As we explain in Part II, the Court has recently 
adopted Justice Scalia’s proposal and thereby solved this problem for the 
vast majority of cases in which it might arise. 
The impossibility of appeal and absence of standards to guide Pearson 
discretion rendered some panel opinions effectively unreviewable, creating 
worrisome incentives for parties and judges to engage in strategic behavior 
aimed at influencing the decision whether to write a merits opinion.  
Professor Beermann has noted that Pearson creates opportunities for district 
and circuit judges, as well as defendants, to act strategically.69  District 
judges can try to influence the likelihood of a merits decision on appeal by 
writing, or declining to write, a merits opinion below, thereby raising or 
lowering the cost of producing a merits opinion on appeal.70  Defendants 
willing to engage in a high-risk litigation strategy may decide to press the 
merits “only when they perceive a strong likelihood of prevailing,” since “a 
strategic choice [by the defendant] not to press the constitutional merits 
might influence the court’s decision whether to decide them.”71  And circuit 
judges will face an even more complex choice—the inevitable result of 
pressures produced by different views amongst judges concerning judicial 
restraint, the importance of constitutional elaboration, and of advancing 
policy agendas through constitutional law.72
 
 66. 541 U.S. 1019, 1023 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
  As Professor Beermann 
 67. Id. at 1023–24. 
 68. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1924 (2007) (“Yet if the plaintiff does not appeal—thereby 
enabling the defendant to argue the alternative ground of no constitutional violation in 
support of affirmance—the defendant may have achieved a pyrrhic victory. . . .  [I]f the 
defendant wins at the court of appeals . . . his victory may be even more pyrrhic.”). 
 69. See Beermann, supra note 55, at 143 (“This new regime invites strategic behavior by 
courts and litigants who, in each case, are left to determine whether it would be beneficial to 
reach the merits or to try to influence whether the merits are reached.”). 
 70. Id. at 173. 
 71. Id. at 172–73. 
 72. See id. at 173 (“Judges may also find that Pearson puts them in a difficult bind. 
While many may be relieved that they no longer have to reach the merits, views on the 
wisdom of reaching the merits will vary.  Some may be committed to principles of restraint 
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concludes, “It is not common for judges to have complete discretion over 
whether to decide unsettled constitutional issues, with no standard 
governing when the judges should reach the issue, and in circumstances in 
which the decision will not affect the outcome of the case before the 
court.”73
E.  Conclusion 
  We agree and, as explained below, believe that this problem can 
be remedied through a simple reform that creates structured discretion. 
The journey from Harlow to Pearson witnessed some dramatic shifts in 
the law of qualified immunity.  Nevertheless, by 2009 the Court had 
reached a largely workable doctrine that balanced a complex array of 
competing demands.  In spite of this accomplishment, a number of 
criticisms of its handiwork—some unpersuasive, some forceful—persisted.  
In the next part, we discuss Camreta v. Greene, the Court’s most recent 
tweak to qualified immunity doctrine and a successful effort to address two 
of three criticisms that remained post-Pearson.  Although we conclude that 
it is no panacea, we see Camreta as a promising step toward smoothly 
functioning doctrine and laud the Court’s success in clarifying both the 
dicta/precedent boundary and the issue of reviewability. 
II.  CAMRETA V. GREENE—REFINING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
In its 2010 Term, the Court held in Camreta v. Greene that it may review 
a lower court’s constitutional ruling at the behest of government officials 
who won a final judgment on qualified immunity grounds.74  This new rule, 
though only supported in Camreta by a bare majority of the fractured Court, 
substantially addresses the difficulties posed by doctrine that permits courts 
to issue otherwise-unreviewable constitutional proclamations.  Henceforth, 
officials who win on qualified immunity in the courts of appeals but are 
found to have violated the Constitution can potentially alleviate their 
“undeniably awkward” situation through Supreme Court review, instead of 
being compelled to either comply with the law or “risk a meritorious 
damages action.”75
Although Justice Kennedy rightly notes a number of potential limits on 
what we call “prevailing party review doctrine” (PPRD)—limits that we 
explore at some length to flesh out their full contours—he substantially 
overstates his case with respect to the significance of these limits.  
Moreover, whereas Justice Kennedy’s dissent focuses mainly on PPRD’s 
   
 
that disfavor reaching the merits, whereas others may place a higher value on ensuring that 
the law develops despite qualified immunity.  Some judges may reach out to decide 
constitutional issues to further a policy agenda and decline to decide the constitutional merits 
when the law leads in a direction contrary to their preferences.  Judges committed to the 
avoidance canon might then feel disadvantaged because they will be on the sidelines 
watching their colleagues create clearly established law with which they may disagree.”). 
 73. Id. at 171. 
 74. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011). 
 75. Jeffries, supra note 58, at 127. 
2011] AVOIDING PERMANENT LIMBO 657 
boundaries, we note one desirable extension—the application of PPRD to 
en banc procedures in the circuit courts.   
On the basis of these evaluations, we argue that Camreta has largely 
solved the problem of reviewability in qualified immunity doctrine.  We 
then conclude this part by returning to the other serious flaws identified in 
Part I.  Although we report that the precedent/dicta boundary has been 
helpfully clarified, we also find that problems of strategic judging rendered 
possible by Pearson survive Camreta and should be addressed through 
further reform if Pearson discretion is to survive as a valuable tool for the 
development of constitutional doctrine. 
A.  Camreta v. Greene 
In late February 2003, Bob Camreta and James Alford arrived at an 
elementary school in Deschutes County, California to ask a young girl 
(S.G.) some questions about her father, Nimrod.76  Nimrod Greene had 
been arrested several weeks earlier for suspected sexual abuse of a 
seventeen-year-old boy, but was soon released and was therefore free in late 
February to spend unsupervised time with his daughters.77  When the 
Oregon Department of Human Services (DHS) learned about this situation, 
Camreta, a child protective services worker, was tasked with assessing 
S.G.’s safety.78  Based on his training and experience, Camreta was 
“concerned about the safety and well-being of Nimrod Greene’s own small 
children” because he was “aware that child sex offenders often act on 
impulse and often direct those impulses again their own children, among 
others.”79  Accompanied by Alford, a deputy sheriff, Camreta interviewed 
S.G. at school because he considered it best “to conduct the interview away 
from the potential influence of suspects, including parents.”80  Such school-
based interviews, Camreta reported, “are a regular part of [child protective 
services] practice and are consistent with DHS rules and training.”81  
However, S.G.’s mother neither learned of this interview in advance nor 
consented to it, and Camreta did not obtain a warrant beforehand.82
S.G.’s mother filed an action on behalf of herself and S.G. alleging that 
Camreta and Alford’s in-school seizure of S.G. without a warrant, parental 
consent, probable cause, or exigent circumstances violated the Fourth 
Amendment.
 
83
 
 76. Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009). 
  The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants, holding that the in-school seizure of S.G. was “objectively 
reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case” and, further, that 
the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because “no reasonable 
school official, caseworker, or police officer would have believed [their] 
 77. Id. at 1016. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (alteration in original). 
 82. Id. at 1016–17. 
 83. Id. at 1020. 
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actions violated the Fourth Amendment.”84  The Ninth Circuit, in an 
opinion by Judge Marsha Berzon, affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.85  However, citing 
Pearson for its authority to engage in such analysis and observing that “the 
constitutional standards governing the in-school seizure of a student who 
may have been abused by her parents are of great importance,” the panel 
also held that “the decision to seize and interrogate S.G. in the absence of a 
warrant, a court order, exigent circumstances, or parental consent was 
unconstitutional.”86  The Ninth Circuit thus reversed the district court “to 
the extent that it held that Alford and Camreta had not violated S.G.’s right 
to be free from an unconstitutional seizure.”87  Camreta and Alford, 
notwithstanding the judgment in their favor, appealed the decision, alleging 
in their petition for certiorari that the Ninth Circuit had erred in its 
constitutional analysis.88
The Supreme Court vacated in part and remanded in part.  Writing for the 
Court, Justice Kagan first addressed the Court’s ability to act on a petition 
brought by government officials in this procedural posture.
 
89  Noting that 
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) confers “unqualified power on this Court to grant 
certiorari ‘upon the petition of any party,’” she concluded that neither 
Article III standing requirements nor prudential considerations barred the 
Court from hearing the case.90
Article III is no bar, she explained, because “[t]he critical question under 
Article III is whether the litigant retains the necessary personal stake in the 
appeal.”
 
91  Since the judgment “may have prospective effect on the 
parties,” especially “if the official regularly engages in that conduct as part 
of his job” and must therefore “either change the way he performs his duties 
or risk a meritorious damages action,” Article III requirements of injury, 
causation, and redressability “often will be met when immunized officials 
seek to challenge a ruling that their conduct violated the Constitution.”92  
The Court added that the plaintiff in such cases will also have “a stake in 
preserving the court’s holding,” since “only if the ruling remains good law 
will she have ongoing protection from the practice.”93
The majority similarly rejected prudential objections.  Although the 
Court’s resources typically “are not well spent superintending each word a 
lower court utters en route to a final judgment in the petitioning party’s 
favor,” the Court noted that it has deviated from this rule when provided 
 
 
 84. Greene v. Camreta, 2006 WL 758547, at *4–5 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 2006). 
 85. Greene, 588 F.3d at 1033. 
 86. Id. at 1021, 1030. 
 87. Id. at 1030. 
 88. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2027 (2011). 
 89. Justice Kagan was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and 
Alito. Id. at 2025–26. 
 90. Id. at 2028. 
 91. Id. at 2029. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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with sufficiently important policy reasons.94  The Court explained that this 
test was satisfied here, since the otherwise unreviewable constitutional 
rulings in qualified immunity cases have been designated by the Court as 
more than mere dicta in order to achieve clarity and observance of 
constitutional law through ongoing elaboration.95  Fearful of leaving these 
rules “permanently in limbo,” the Court has allowed “lower courts to avoid 
avoidance”—an option that requires judges to “think hard, and then think 
hard again” before reaching constitutional merits, and that creates a need for 
some method of review other than defiance by officials of “practices that 
have been declared illegal.”96
The Court limited this procedural holding in two respects.  First, it 
reserved judgment on the question whether appellate courts can review 
cases in this posture arising from district court decisions.
 
97  Second, the 
Court emphasized that it retains discretionary authority to hear cases and 
will not automatically grant similar petitions in the future.98
Having established its authority to hear the case, the Court proceeded to 
find the case moot.  Noting that S.G. would soon turn eighteen and had 
moved to a different state, the Court found that “she faces not the slightest 
possibility of being seized in a school in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction as 
part of a child abuse investigation.”
 
99  As a result, applying ordinary 
principles of justiciability, the Court dismissed the case and vacated the 
portion of the Ninth Circuit opinion addressing the merits issue.100
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion indicating his willingness to 
consider in the future an “end to the extraordinary practice of ruling upon 
constitutional questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses 
qualified immunity.”
 
101  Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, 
concurred in the judgment and wrote separately to register her view that the 
Court ought not reach difficult questions about prevailing party review in a 
moot case that merits only vacatur.102
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented from the majority’s 
decision to “override jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of 
the Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions.”
 
103  Objecting 
to the Court’s embrace of prevailing party review, he criticized the 
majority’s interpretation of precedent, worried that this exception would 
quickly become common practice, and noted that the Fourth Amendment 
question at issue could readily be addressed through ordinary review.104
 
 94. Id. at 2030. 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 2031–32. 
 97. Id. at 2033. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2034. 
 100. Id. at 2034–36. 
 101. Id. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 2036 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 103. Id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 2037–40. 
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Justice Kennedy also argued that qualified immunity doctrine stands “in 
tension with conventional principles of case-or-controversy 
adjudication.”105  Noting that the Court’s exaltation of mere obiter dicta 
into appealable precedent functionally equates dicta with declaratory 
judgments and injunctions—and that S.G. lacked Article III standing to 
obtain such relief—Justice Kennedy remarked that the “Court appears to 
approve the issuance of such judgments outside the bounds of Article III 
jurisdiction.”106  This exception is not worth its price of departure from 
ordinary procedure, he added, because the Court’s newfound power of 
merits review in these cases depends on the availability of defendants with 
standing—which, he prophesied, will be hard to find.107  Indeed, in this 
very case the Court lost jurisdiction over Alford because he retired from the 
Sheriff’s Department.108  And in the future, Justice Kennedy explained, few 
officers will present a cognizable interest in litigating the merits on appeal 
since “there is little possibility that a constitutional decision on the merits 
will again influence [any given] officer’s conduct.”109  Thus, even after 
Camreta, plaintiffs may be able to obtain binding constitutional 
determinations beyond the Court’s reach.110
Justice Kennedy continued his criticism in two final sections.  First, 
noting that “[a]n inert rule of law does not cause particular, concrete 
injury,” and that Camreta lacks an “adverse judgment from which to 
appeal,” Justice Kennedy characterized Camreta’s suit as “a new 
declaratory judgment action in this Court against the Court of Appeals.”
 
111  
This result, he warned, is inconsistent with Article III.112  Second, invoking 
the availability of other methods by which to elaborate constitutional 
doctrine, he suggested that the Court consider “refinements to our qualified 
immunity jurisprudence” should the Court’s “puzzling misadventure in 
constitutional dictum” continue in future cases.113
B.  Camreta and Reviewability:  A Successful Intervention 
 
Camreta represents a refinement of the procedural system created by 
Harlow, Siegert, and Pearson.  Although it does not address all of the 
objections leveled against that regime, it does respond to a powerful and 
frequent criticism—namely, the unavailability of Supreme Court review for 
constitutional decisions that exert a near-precedential power over public 
officials.  Indeed, Camreta expressly recognizes this anomaly in the Court’s 
certiorari practice, which it characterizes as sufficiently serious to justify 
“bending our usual rule to permit consideration of immunized officials’ 
 
 105. Id. at 2040. 
 106. Id. at 2041. 
 107. Id. at 2041–42. 
 108. Id. at 2041. 
 109. Id. at 2042. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 2043. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 2045 (quoting Leval, supra note 31, at 1275). 
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petitions.”114  It thus appears as if the Court has solved the problem of 
reviewability.  Justice Kennedy, however, charges in his dissent that “the 
Court . . . fails to solve the problem it identifies.”  To explain why, he 
examines some of the difficulties attendant to finding PPRD plaintiffs and 
defendants with cognizable Article III standing on appeal.115
In this section, we first follow Justice Kennedy’s lead to explore limits on 
PPRD.  Notwithstanding our ability to imagine numerous circumstances 
under which PPRD is rendered problematic or inapplicable, we respectfully 
disagree with Justice Kennedy’s view that the Court has failed to solve the 
problem of reviewability.  Rather, we conclude that the Court successfully 
reached an appropriate compromise in light of the need to weigh PPRD’s 
virtues against other weighty considerations, many of them grounded in 
Article III.  Guided by Camreta’s reasoning, we then propose an extension 
of PPRD to the en banc procedures of the courts of appeals—a development 
that would help serve justice to individual parties and that may also increase 
the overall quality of merits opinions issued under Pearson discretion.  
After discussing the virtues of such a reform, we explore two familiar 
concerns (dicta/precedent and strategic judging) and identify a new one 
(incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys), and conclude that the single most 
important challenge post-Camreta involves unstructured judicial discretion 
that creative incentives for strategic behavior.  
 
1.  Camreta’s Limits:  Defendants, Injuries, and Plaintiffs 
One source of limitations on PPRD may be the named defendant.  As 
Justice Kennedy notes, in at least some cases public officials could follow 
Deputy Sheriff Alford and retire before a case can be appealed (or while it 
is on appeal).116
Of course, there is something slightly absurd about the application of 
such individualized standing concerns to cases where the government 
typically pays for attorneys and indemnifies the official.
  In a similar vein, Camreta makes merits appealability 
contingent upon the defendant not moving, dying, resigning, being fired, 
changing jobs, renouncing past practices, being incapacitated, or otherwise 
finding herself in a position that renders claims of Article III standing 
implausible.  On a more practical level, it also renders appealability 
contingent upon the fortuity of identifying a defendant who is willing to 
endure the potential hassles and frustrations of litigation to vindicate a 
general principle after already prevailing on qualified immunity grounds. 
117
 
 114. Id. at 2030 (majority opinion). 
  This is 
especially true in the large number of cases where the defendant is 
effectively standing in for a class of similarly situated public officials, each 
of whom is equally “injured” with respect to their future behavior by the 
allegedly erroneous constitutional ruling.  But this does not mean that those 
standing rules should not apply—they most certainly should, particularly 
 115. Id. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 2041. 
 117. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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given that § 1983 and Bivens liability targets defendants in their official 
capacity and not as mere stand-ins for the entity for which they work.  
Thus, absurdity aside, ordinary standing principles potentially limit the 
reach of Camreta’s new doctrine. 
A second source of limits on PPRD may be the nature of different 
constitutional wrongs.  Simply put, certain kinds of alleged constitutional 
violations are more likely to sustain standing than others.  Social workers 
who regularly interview children in particular settings or police officers 
who regularly stop cars under a particular legal theory will provide ideal 
candidates for post-Camreta standing, whereas there are few jurisdictions 
where individual police officers can seriously argue that they (rather than 
the general class of “officers in the police department”) are likely to again 
use excessive force during a high-speed car chase and therefore suffer from 
a ruling that limits their options.118
This may prove problematic if some classes of rulings that typically 
escape Camreta’s compass involve violations rarely adjudicated elsewhere.  
For example, the constitutional issues attendant to a § 1983 suit alleging 
excessive force by the police are unlikely to be resolved through defensive 
assertions of rights in criminal trials, municipal liability, or requests for 
declaratory relief.
  As a result, Camreta may not solve the 
appealability issue uniformly across the domain of constitutional decisions.  
Rather, it may create certain classes of rulings that readily benefit from 
PPRD, and others that are less likely to survive standing analysis. 
119  Such issues are therefore prime candidates for 
constitutional adjudication secondary to a finding of qualified immunity 
because such rulings may be crucial to the refinement and elaboration of 
constitutional law.  But if those sorts of cases also present particularly 
forceful Article III standing concerns, as Justice Kennedy argues in his 
dissent,120
A final source of limits on PPRD may be constitutional tort plaintiffs.  
Although the Camreta Court determined that mootness wrought by a 
change in the plaintiff’s status leads to vacatur of the lower court’s merits 
ruling—thereby cutting off one source of constitutional rulings that might 
escape review post-Camreta—one further plaintiff-related concern remains:  
in some cases the plaintiff may lack PPRD standing because the plaintiff 
cannot show a reasonable likelihood of once again encountering the alleged 
violation.
 then Camreta’s limits might be most apparent in situations 
where its doctrine is most needed. 
121
 
 118. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
  In such cases, unless the Court departs from ordinary standing 
principles to accommodate the policy objective of securing appellate 
review, the defendant will not be able to appeal adverse constitutional 
rulings to the Supreme Court.  Further, unlike cases where a change in 
status causes mootness, vacatur of the merits decision will not ordinarily be 
an appropriate remedy because there is no appeal as of right to the Supreme 
Court.  Those opinions will therefore stand as good, unreviewable law. 
 119. See Jeffries, supra note 58, at 136. 
 120. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 121. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 111 (1983). 
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2.  Beyond Limits:  Why Camreta Succeeds 
Notwithstanding these potential limits, PPRD can still be expected to 
function as a fine substitute for ordinary appellate procedures involving the 
Supreme Court.  First, our ability to proliferate hypotheticals in which 
PPRD is inappropriate will likely have a larger effect on law school final 
exams than on the overall development of constitutional law in § 1983 and 
Bivens cases.  The vast majority of cases will likely involve defendants who 
are still doing the same job and plaintiffs whose status is basically similar in 
all key respects, thereby satisfying the standing concerns identified above.  
Second, given the striking rarity of Supreme Court review of panel opinions 
for which certiorari is requested, it is hardly as though any more than the 
slightest fraction of such cases ever enjoyed a realistic probability of review 
even before Camreta was decided.  In that sense, Camreta addresses a 
problem that might be less serious than it initially seems, a point that 
Professor Beermann makes by emphasizing that “the likelihood that any 
particular case will be accepted for review by the Supreme Court is so low 
that as a practical matter this procedural quirk does not significantly change 
the situation.”122
Finally, it is no damning criticism to say that PPRD will not cover each 
and every case.  PPRD represents a policy choice by the Court to bend 
minor rules governing the availability of certiorari in order to achieve 
fairness for litigants within a doctrinal structure that effectively balances a 
wide range of considerations, including the need for constitutional 
elaboration.  The harm that flows from the occasional impossibility of 
appeal—which seems quite small, given the infrequency of such cases and 
the preexisting unlikelihood of successful certiorari—is hardly a major 
price to pay for workable doctrine that has taken decades to produce.  
Moreover, as we discuss in Part IV, Justice Kennedy’s “refinements” would 
serve only to remove this minor harm from defendants by transforming it 
into a major harm inflicted upon an otherwise unprotected public.  In those 
crucial respects, the Court did not “fail” when it reached a reasonable 
compromise that, though not perfect, secures and improves a well-
functioning scheme of constitutional regulation. 
 
Attention to Camreta’s limitations, though merited, must therefore not 
divert our focus from the fact that the opinion goes a long way toward 
fixing an important flaw.  It does so by allowing the vast majority of 
defendants who have won on qualified immunity grounds at the expense of 
an adverse merits holding to appeal that part of the decision, thereby 
addressing criticisms emphasizing the illegitimacy of procedures that 
permit unreviewable constitutional determinations. 
 
 122. Beermann, supra note 55, at 161. 
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3.  Extending Camreta to En Banc Review 
The Supreme Court hears very few cases and grants only approximately 
1 percent of all certiorari petitions each year.123
Camreta formally reserved the question of PPRD’s applicability to 
appellate review of district court decisions,
  The vast majority of 
defendants keen to appeal constitutional rulings under PPRD will therefore 
receive little benefit from Camreta, other than the joy of reading a likely 
futile certiorari petition written by their government-funded attorney.  
However, although the Court is uniquely capable of achieving uniformity in 
the law by resolving circuit splits, it is not the only court capable of 
bringing close attention and the power of appellate review to bear on 
controversial panel decisions.  Whereas the last two sections discussed 
limits of PPRD, this section argues that the courts of appeals should 
consider themselves authorized by Camreta’s reasoning to hear en banc 
appeals from merits decisions reached by panels in qualified immunity 
cases. 
124 but in fact forecasted its 
disapproval of such a practice by observing that “district court decisions—
unlike those from the courts of appeals—do not necessarily settle 
constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of qualified 
immunity.”125
There are several other virtues of en banc review that make it particularly 
appropriate to qualified immunity cases.  First, and most importantly, en 
banc procedures would increase the overall amount of review available for 
merits rulings and thus further palliate the unreviewability concern that 
animates Camreta.  Second, just like certiorari procedures, en banc review 
is discretionary and thus does not pose a major threat of adding 
significantly to the docket of already-overworked appellate judges.
  This proposed basis for distinguishing certiorari review 
from ordinary appellate review does not apply to en banc procedures.  Panel 
decisions do settle constitutional standards, are intended to prevent repeated 
claims of immunity, and are regularly treated as precedent for that purpose.  
Given that en banc review is ordinarily available for decisions with these 
characteristics, Camreta provides no reason to exclude them here.  With 
respect to the considerations identified as potentially relevant by Camreta, 
en banc review is thus unproblematic. 
126
 
 123. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK:  A JUDGE’S VIEW 228–29 
(2010). 
  
Third, this procedure would increase the odds that defendants are able to 
obtain review focused primarily on legal error in a panel’s constitutional 
reasoning; as Justice Breyer has made clear, the Supreme Court is not a 
“court of error” and exercises its docket discretion with an eye to deep 
circuit splits, overall importance, clean factual presentation, and many other 
 124. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2033 n.7 (“We note, however, that the considerations 
persuading us to permit review of petitions in this posture may not have the same force as 
applied to a district court decision.”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En 
Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 216–17 (1999). 
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issues.127  Fourth, awareness of the possibility that an opinion will be 
carefully scrutinized by all of the judges in a circuit might have a salutary 
effect on the quality of panel reasoning.128  Finally, en banc review would 
increase the availability of review for decisions produced by panels that 
stand at an ideological extreme or are ideologically idiosyncratic with 
respect to their home circuit—and thus might pose a greater risk of strategic 
judging post-Pearson because of their ideological commitments to shaping 
constitutional law.129
The main limit of en banc review as a “fix” for the unreviewability 
problem is that the courts of appeals rarely hear cases through that 
procedure.
 
130  The Second Circuit hears cases en banc less often than the 
Supreme Court grants certiorari, and even the famously robust Ninth Circuit 
en banc docket comprises a small proportion of total Ninth Circuit panel 
decisions.131
 
 127. See BREYER, supra note 
  Nevertheless, insofar as Camreta’s goal was to create a 
vehicle whereby the Court can police outliers and achieve the general 
benefits of review for a previously unreviewable class of decisions, en banc 
procedures can help achieve those ends in a broader range of cases without 
consuming the Court’s carefully guarded resources.  More importantly, the 
combined availability of en banc and Supreme Court review will make 
123, at 228–29. 
 128. See RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 32–34 (2008). 
 129. See Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1617 
(2000) (arguing for more dramatic reform of en banc procedures, but acknowledging that 
concerns about ideological divergence might be addressed in part by en banc review 
procedures).  Scholars have recently emphasized the relationships among judicial decision 
making, ideology, and panel composition. See, e.g., Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A 
Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 226–34 (1999). 
 130. See George, supra note 126, at 214 (“Circuit courts rarely invoke the en banc 
procedure; courts of appeals resolve fewer than one percent of their cases en banc.”); id. at 
213 (noting that circuits “effectively have become the courts of last resort for most litigants 
and the source of doctrinal development for most legal issues”). 
 131. See Ricci v. Destefano, 530 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2008) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“I do not think it is enough for [the Second Circuit] to 
dilate on exceptionally important issues in a sheaf of concurrences and dissents arguing over 
the denial of in banc review.  If issues are important enough to warrant Supreme Court 
review, they are important enough for our full Court to consider and decide on the 
merits. . . .  [T]o rely on tradition to deny rehearing in banc starts to look very much like 
abuse of discretion.”).  In a series of studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Judge 
Newman of the Second Circuit described and praised his circuit’s tradition of avoiding en 
banc practice. See Jon O. Newman, Foreword, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit:  The 
Virtue of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 365 (1984); see also Jon O. Newman, In Banc 
Practice in the Second Circuit, 1989–1993, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 491 (1994).  The voluminous 
literature on the Ninth Circuit’s distinctive use of en banc procedures has focused mainly on 
whether the circuit has grown too big and whether it ought to be divided. See, e.g., Arthur D. 
Hellman, Getting it Right:  Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425 (2000); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and 
Jurisprudence:  The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 541, 548–50 (1989) (evaluating Ninth Circuit papers from 1981–86 and 
concluding that “en banc ballots were rarely requested and even more rarely successful. . . . 
[and] contributed only minimally to the preservation of uniformity in the law of the Ninth 
Circuit”). But see Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries—Why the Proposal 
to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 
22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917, 928–45 (1990). 
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merits determinations in qualified immunity cases just as appealable as any 
other panel opinion (barring the Article III limitations discussed above).  In 
that light, criticism regarding the rarity of review dissolves into little more 
than a background frustration with our legal system’s limited resources and 
the accompanying rarity of review above the panel level. 
This proposal is meant to supplement Camreta’s already adequate 
solution to the problem of reviewability discussed in Part I.  We do not 
believe that en banc review is necessary to the success of PPRD as a 
remedy for non-reviewability, but we maintain that the availability of such 
review follows directly from Camreta’s reasoning and would be a 
beneficial development.  As we explain in the next section, Camreta’s 
success also extended to clarification of the vexing dicta/precedent issue.  
However, the Camreta Court made only partial progress toward limiting 
incentives for strategic judging. 
C.  Old Concerns Revisited:  Dicta and Strategic Judging 
Camreta shed welcome light on the location of merits holdings along the 
dicta/precedent spectrum.  More plainly than ever before, the Court 
explained that “these constitutional determinations . . . are not mere 
dicta.”132
They are rulings that have a significant future effect on the conduct of 
public officials—both the prevailing parties and their co-workers—and 
the policies of the government units to which they belong.  And more:  
they are rulings self-consciously designed to produce this effect, by 
establishing controlling law and preventing invocations of immunity in 
later cases.  And still more:  they are rulings designed this way with this 
Court’s permission, to promote clarity—and observance—of 
constitutional rules.
  It went on to explain: 
133
The Court thus invokes the significant purposes of elaborating 
constitutional law and fine-tuning constitutional regulations as a trump to 
default dicta norms.
 
134  Although such a departure from default rules is 
unusual, the norm that courts should only address issues necessary to the 
resolution of a case is not absolute and has been abrogated when doing so 
“makes sense in light of the need for rational development in the law.”135
 
 132. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011). 
  
Qualified immunity, as the Court rightly observes, is a paradigm case of 
doctrine that demands special treatment to ensure such development.  
Camreta thus constitutes a performative act whereby the Court exercises its 
power to formalize the already widespread understanding that merits rulings 
have “a significant future effect” by treating them as appealable precedent 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  Professor Michael Dorf identifies one such norm as the non-precedential 
character of dicta, a norm that Camreta expressly declined to employ when deciding how to 
characterize merits rulings issued under Pearson discretion. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and 
Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994). 
 135. See Beermann, supra note 55, at 156; see also Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell 
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2005). 
2011] AVOIDING PERMANENT LIMBO 667 
rather than as quasi-dicta.136
The Court’s success in addressing reviewability and the dicta/precedent 
boundary was not matched by similar achievement in cabining strategic 
judging.  Although the Court does suggest that Pearson discretion is 
henceforth unavailable for certain classes of cases, it does not articulate 
more general standards regarding the appropriateness of hearing a merits 
claim after finding qualified immunity.  Lower courts must still exercise 
unstructured discretion in making those determinations and do not face the 
threat of reversal for whichever choice they ultimately reach in each case.  
Parties must guess which arguments might move a court to reach the 
constitutional merits even after finding immunity, and have no right to an 
explanation of the court’s reasoning if they guess incorrectly.  Although 
Camreta’s creation of PPRD will help limit the seriousness of this issue by 
permitting reversal of strategically-motivated decisions that depart too far 
from the judicial mainstream, the rarity of post-panel appellate review 
renders Camreta’s solution inevitably incomplete.  Strategic judging is 
therefore the primary challenge that awaits the Court’s attention when it 
revisits qualified immunity doctrine in future cases. 
  Lower courts should therefore follow this 
example and treat merits rulings as functionally precedential in nature. 
D.  A New Concern?:  Incentives for Plaintiffs’ Attorneys 
Efforts to reform doctrine always raise the possibility that a court is 
simply trading one problem for another.  In this section, we raise and reject 
one version of this claim that might be leveled against Camreta, identifying 
a potential perversity in the incentives it creates for plaintiffs’ attorneys and 
then noting two solutions (one mundane, one dramatic). 
Unless the Court’s grant of certiorari in future cases also includes a grant 
on the plaintiff’s cross-petition for reconsideration of the qualified 
immunity determination, plaintiffs will ordinarily have lost any possibility 
of judgment or recovery before briefing even begins.  In such situations, the 
plaintiff’s original attorney may be inadequately incentivized to pursue the 
case on appeal if he or she originally accepted it partly with an eye on 
potential fee shifting.137
 
 136. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030. 
  In some cases, the attorney might decline to 
litigate an appeal.  The plaintiff, in turn, might find it burdensome to retain 
expensive private counsel to litigate the constitutional merits on an appeal 
to the Supreme Court or an en banc circuit court.  Whereas fee-shifting 
statutes do not ordinarily present this problem—either the plaintiff wins and 
 137. Cf. Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort 
Litigation:  The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 
CORNELL L. REV. 719, 768 (1988) (“[O]ne theme in the literature that our data confirm is 
that most civil rights litigation is not brought by institutional litigators or by large firms 
engaging in pro bono activity.”). But see id. at 780 (“There is also modest evidence that the 
1976 fee award statute led to a decline in success rates, and an increase in litigation rates, 
relative to other civil actions.  Surprisingly, there is little evidence that the fees statute led to 
significantly increased filings or to increased access for prisoners to the private attorney 
market.  These last findings suggest that attorney fees statutes may have less of an effect on 
filing rates than is commonly believed.”). 
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is defending an award, or the plaintiff loses and has retained willing counsel 
to challenge that judgment—qualified immunity creates an unusual 
incentive structure whereby a plaintiff’s attorney can be guaranteed no 
recovery yet still face a request from the client to handle a costly appeal. 
Although such situations are not cognizable as a bar to Article III 
standing, they may disturb the adverseness that the Court demands of its 
cases, and thereby reduce the quality of both representation and decision 
making in PPRD appeals.  Moreover, these pressures might put future 
constitutional tort plaintiffs in an awkward position if fee-oriented lawyers 
abandon their case on appeal to the Supreme Court.  Unable to afford 
expensive representation, these plaintiffs may be forced to seek pro bono 
representation to pursue a constitutional tort claim for which they have no 
chance of recovering monetary damages. 
However, in practice this concern will likely prove trivial.  As compared 
to ordinary civil litigation, a disproportionate number of § 1983 and Bivens 
plaintiffs are represented by public interest lawyers or civil rights attorneys 
who “may be less motivated by the prospects of monetary reward than the 
traditional tort lawyer.”138
It is also possible that this concern may disappear due to a more dramatic 
shift in the rules governing fee-shifting.  Professor Nancy Leong has 
identified a tension between Camreta and the rule from Farrar v. Hobby
  Further, high-powered appellate practices might 
offer free representation that plaintiffs would be happy to accept, 
inadequate counsel may not matter because amici with an interest in the 
relevant law will provide adequate briefing, fee-oriented attorneys might 
agree to litigate the appeal for the opportunity to argue a Supreme Court or 
en banc circuit case, and the court can always appoint an amicus to share 
argument time. 
139 
that “a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his claim 
materially alters the relationship between the prevailing parties by 
modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way [that] directly benefits the 
plaintiff.”140  She argues that a merits ruling that has the effect of 
modifying future official conduct, and giving the plaintiff a sufficient stake 
for standing should also be found to “materially alter[] the relationship 
between the parties”—thereby rendering the plaintiff a “prevailing party” 
for purposes of recovering attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.141  
Granting that Camreta itself does not expressly contemplate such an 
interpretation of the fee-shifting provisions, she insightfully observes that 
“the tension could well infuse litigation.”142
 
 138. See id. at 744. 
 
 139. 506 U.S. 103 (1992). 
 140. Nancy Leong, Commentary:  Allowing Appeals by Winners, SCOTUSBLOG (June 2, 
2011, 8:41AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=121018 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111–
12). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (“On the one hand, the Court now readily acknowledges that harm to the 
government can serve as a justification for allowing judicial review of the constitutional 
question.  On the other hand, for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees, it historically has 
refused to acknowledge that the plaintiff’s suit has caused the very ruling resulting in that 
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Although it is possible that Camreta will create difficult situations for 
plaintiffs who lose fee-oriented counsel on appeal to the Supreme Court, we 
thus do not believe this will be a serious problem.  Regardless, Professor 
Leong’s intriguing suggestion may independently point the way toward a 
solution that has much larger and much more exciting implications for civil 
rights litigation under § 1983 and Bivens. 
E.  Conclusion 
Camreta constitutes a largely successful effort by the Court to 
substantially take the wind out of the sails of a recurrent criticism targeting 
its qualified immunity doctrine.  Although PPRD is limited in numerous 
respects, it will usually function as an adequate fix to the problem of 
unreviewability.  To further achieve this goal, the circuit courts should hold 
that en banc review is available for constitutional tort defendants who lose 
on the merits secondary to a finding of qualified immunity. 
Camreta also brought badly needed clarity to the dicta/precedent 
boundary, tipping merits decisions issued alongside a finding of qualified 
immunity decisively toward the realm of “precedent.”  The single most 
important issue that remains is therefore strategic judging.  However, before 
turning to possible reforms, we first suggest that such reform proposals may 
face a more significant and global challenge in the near future from the 
Court’s more conservative members.  After explaining why Camreta 
provides cause to worry, we argue that the status quo is vastly preferable to 
an alternative formulation of qualified immunity doctrine mentioned by 
Justices Kennedy and Scalia.  We also speculate on the strategic and 
jurisprudential motivations that might undergird the Camreta majority’s 
retreat toward a limited view of the scope of Pearson discretion. 
III.  STRUCTURE DISCRETION, DON’T ELIMINATE IT 
A.  Worrisome Signs:  The Precipice of Limbo 
Camreta suggests the worrisome possibility that several Justices are 
losing faith in the basic framework of qualified immunity doctrine.  Justice 
Kagan’s approach is decidedly reformist, but articulates key premises of the 
status quo in terms that waffle between clear support and pronounced 
hesitation.  More disturbingly, Justices Scalia and Kennedy authored 
opinions suggesting deep unease with the direction of recent jurisprudence.  
This section explores these concerns, links them to larger trends in 
conservative jurisprudence on the Court, and argues that supporters of the 
status quo may soon face a serious challenge that threatens Pearson’s grant 
of judicial discretion. 
Although Justice Kagan’s opinion in Camreta aligned itself with a 
reformist agenda, it displayed noticeably less enthusiasm than Pearson did 
for merits holdings in qualified immunity cases.  In Pearson, Justice Alito 
 
judicial review.  Perhaps future litigation will press the Court on this apparent 
inconsistency.”). 
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identified a broad array of circumstances under which it would be unwise to 
reach the constitutional merits after finding qualified immunity—a list born 
of hostility to Saucier.143  However, after enumerating these considerations, 
he emphasized the importance of constitutional elaboration and added that 
the “two-step Saucier procedure is often, but not always, advantageous.”144  
In Camreta, Justice Kagan strikes a more ambivalent note.  Acknowledging 
that “we have permitted lower courts to avoid avoidance,” she cautioned 
that “courts should think hard, and then think hard again, before turning 
small cases into large ones.”145  Characterizing Pearson’s list of concerns 
as a “detailed . . . range of circumstances in which courts should address 
only the immunity question,” she concluded that “following the two-step 
procedure . . . is sometimes beneficial to clarify the legal standards 
governing public officials.”146
The shift from Pearson to Camreta thus signals disfavor toward merits 
rulings and a broad new range of circumstances under which the merits 
cannot be reached.  This evolution in the Court’s views might be interpreted 
in several ways:  (1) diminished enthusiasm for merits rulings; (2) an effort 
to formally structure Pearson discretion; or (3) an attempt at saving 
Pearson discretion by narrowing it.  Whereas the second and third of these 
projects would be laudable, the first would be deeply troubling—
particularly in light of concerns expressed by some of the Justices who 
wrote separately in Camreta. 
 
Justice Kagan’s opinion was accompanied by a concurrence and dissent 
that, viewed together, raise red flags about the future of Pearson discretion.  
Justice Scalia’s concurrence announced his newfound willingness to 
consider adopting what one might call a “reverse-Saucier” approach that 
bars merits opinions after a finding of qualified immunity.147  And Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, praised alternative vehicles 
for elaborating constitutional law while calling for doctrinal “refinements” 
that avoid the standing issues he considered central to the case.148  
Suggesting that he too may favor reverse-Saucier, Justice Kennedy noted 
that “the Court might find it necessary to reconsider its special permission 
that the Courts of Appeals may issue unnecessary merits determinations in 
qualified immunity cases with binding precedential effect.”149
 
 143. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 237–40 (2009). 
  This hint, 
however, received only partial elaboration in an opinion that pointed in 
several directions simultaneously—touching briefly on reverse-Saucier, but 
 144. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). 
 145. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031–32 (2011). 
 146. Id. at 2032 (emphasis added). 
 147. See id. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion, which reasonably 
applies our precedents, strange as they may be.  The alternative solution, as Justice Kennedy 
suggests, is to end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional questions 
unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified immunity.  The parties have not asked 
us to adopt that approach, but I would be willing to consider it in an appropriate case.”). 
 148. Id. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 2043. 
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also proposing modifications to damages and fee-shifting.150  Oscillating 
between acknowledgement that “there will be instances where courts 
discuss the merits in qualified immunity cases” and an insistence that “the 
Court should provide no special permission to reach the merits,” this 
opinion clearly suggests that Justice Kennedy’s views are in flux.151
This development is especially striking because Justice Kennedy 
authored Saucier just over one decade ago.  The evolution of his views has 
been accompanied by a great deal of doctrinal instability in qualified 
immunity, as the Court mandated merits determinations, reversed this 
position in response to withering criticism, and engaged in heated debates 
over the nature of merits determinations, their status as dicta or precedent, 
and the permissibility of appeal.  Such dramatic change in recent years 
suggests that there is still much room for development in the Court’s views, 
and that the Justices will remain open to new ideas when faced with cases 
presenting these issues.  Although some commentators find comfort in the 
fact that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined Justice Kagan’s 
opinion, and assume that Justices Sotomayor and Breyer remain loyal to 
Pearson discretion,
 
152
Acceptance of the Scalia-Kennedy reverse-Saucier proposal is therefore a 
live possibility—and one that would accord with recent trends in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.  One such trend involves hostility to a broad 
conception of the role that private citizens should play in the enforcement of 
rights.  Thus, in recent years, “the Court has launched a wholesale assault 
on one of the primary mechanisms Congress has used for enforcing civil 
rights:  the private attorney general.”
 the hint of defection by three Justices in a single 
opinion ought to be cause for greater alarm given the role that such signals 
in concurrences have played over the past decade in predicting future 
changes of heart. 
153  Since “virtually all modern civil 
rights statutes rely heavily on private attorneys general,” this assault has 
“cut down both on the amount of civil rights enforcement and on the 
development of the law through the creation of binding precedent.”154
 
 150. Id. at 2044. 
  A 
related trend involves skepticism of creating new constitutional rights.  As 
 151. Id. at 2045. 
 152. See, e.g., Steven D. Schwinn, Civil Rights Appeals:  The Court’s Opinion in Camreta 
v. Greene, CONST. L. PROF BLOG (May 27, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
conlaw/2011/05/civil-rights-appeals-the-courts-opinion-in-camreta-v-greene.html 
(“The case likely leaves Pearson permission on solid ground, even if as many as three 
Justices may be willing to reconsider it, and even if it suggested that in some narrow class of 
cases (like this one) the constitutional question could become moot, thus undermining it.”). 
 153. Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
183, 186.  As Professor Karlan explains,  
The idea behind the “private attorney general” can be stated relatively simply:  
Congress can vindicate important public policy goals by empowering private 
individuals to bring suit. . . .  [T]he current reliance on private attorneys 
general . . . consists essentially of providing a cause of action for individuals who 
have been injured by the conduct Congress wishes to proscribe, usually with the 
additional incentive of attorney’s fees for a prevailing plaintiff.  
Id. 
 154. Id. at 187–88. 
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Professor John Greabe explains, “[T]he Court’s conservative members [are 
not] particularly supportive of the creation of new constitutional rights. . . .   
[T]hey generally object to the creation of new constitutional rights as a form 
of judicial activism.”155
Modifications to qualified immunity that further limit opportunities for 
private plaintiffs to bring suits that create new rights might therefore prove 
appealing to some of the conservative Justices, especially if they believe 
that alternative and more legitimate methods for the elaboration of rights 
already exist.  Justice Kennedy reveals some attraction to this belief in 
Camreta, noting that “[o]ther dynamics permit the law of the Constitution 
to be elaborated within the conventional framework of a case or 
controversy.”
 
156  Notwithstanding the ultimate inadequacy of such 
alternative dynamics—the deficiencies of which we explore below—their 
presence may encourage some Justices to feel assured that elimination of 
Pearson discretion would not result in intolerable levels of stagnation.  It 
would not be the first time that the alleged availability of alternative 
protections led the Court to eliminate important sources of rights-creation 
and rights-protection, even when those alternatives were demonstrably 
inadequate to the task of meaningfully securing the rights at issue.157
In the next two sections, we explain in greater detail why constitutional 
elaboration matters, show how it may be threatened by a retreat from the 
practice of ruling on the merits where the defendant official is immune, and 
argue that the alternative mechanisms of constitutional elaboration 
mentioned by Justice Kennedy in Camreta are highly imperfect substitutes 
for the post-Pearson status quo. 
 
B.  Back from the Brink:  The Need for Constitutional Elaboration 
As Professor Pamela Karlan has explained, “Much of constitutional 
law . . . involves the refinement of broad constitutional commands into 
essentially regulatory codes of conduct.”158  New cases in which courts 
make constitutional determinations provide opportunities to apply enduring 
principles to an evolving society, thus refining constitutional law and 
clarifying to officials the scope of permissible practices.  Litigation under 
§ 1983 and Bivens is one of numerous means by which courts translate 
constitutional norms into specific rules, thereby achieving the related goals 
of redressing individual violations and effectuating deeper values.159
 
 155. Healy, supra note 
  The 
rights thereby created, however, are defined and protected in significant part 
by the availability of remedies for their violation.  Although the notion of a 
remedy for every right is more “a flexible normative principle than . . . an 
52, at 881–82 (suggesting that conservatives on the Court have 
tolerated an expansion of rights thus far primarily because of a commitment to expanding 
federal judicial power). 
 156. See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2043 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 157. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
 158. Karlan, supra note 68, at 1915. 
 159. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1800 (1991). 
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unbending rule of constitutional law,”160 there must nevertheless “be a 
generally effective remedial structure if constitutional law is to have 
functional meaning.”161
Section 1983 and Bivens provide for such remedies against public 
officials, but only if the claimed right was “clearly established” when 
violated.  This approach creates a right-remedy gap, resulting in a 
significant “societal loss in underenforced constitutional norms,” in order to 
achieve such objectives as fairness to officials and government 
efficiency.
 
162  However, by separating immunity determinations from 
constitutional rulings, qualified immunity doctrine risks freezing the 
elaboration of constitutional law:  “the corpus of constitutional law grows 
only when courts address and resolve novel constitutional claims, but courts 
often cannot order a remedy for such claims because of their novelty.”163
Such stagnation would not simply entail jurisprudential costs.  As 
constitutional law ceased growing in response to new or unprecedented 
official action, executive officials would face few legal barriers to repeated 
abuses.  Persistent uncertainty in the law would consistently disadvantage 
individuals alleging constitutional injuries—particularly those who have 
been wronged by a single official abusively exercising power—and impede 
the public interest in developing a well-functioning body of constitutional 
regulation.
 
164  As Dean Jeffries explains, “[T]he repeated invocation of 
qualified immunity will reduce the meaning of the Constitution to . . . the 
most grudging conception that an executive officer could reasonably 
entertain.”165  This is why the Supreme Court has continually 
authorized166—or even mandated167
C.  False Lights:  The Inadequacy of Alternatives 
—constitutional rulings, even where a 
court finds that the defendant enjoys immunity from suit on “not clearly 
established” grounds. 
The need for Pearson discretion is not obviated by the possibility of 
constitutional elaboration elsewhere.  The three most commonly mentioned 
alternatives—all specifically invoked by Justice Kennedy in Camreta—are 
municipal liability, suits for declaratory or injunctive relief, and suppression 
challenges in criminal cases.  We discuss each in turn, focusing in particular 
on the criminal context because it raises the most difficult and subtle issues. 
 
 160. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338 (1993). 
 161. See Jeffries, supra note 58, at 117. 
 162. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 
87, 90 (1999). 
 163. John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!:  The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional 
Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 405 (1999). 
 164. See Wells, supra note 49, at 1561–62. 
 165. Jeffries, supra note 58, at 120. 
 166. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 245 (2009). 
 167. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
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1.  Municipal Liability 
Plaintiffs alleging municipal liability for a constitutional injury face the 
daunting task of explaining how the violation at issue is an “official policy 
or custom” of the municipality,168 a requirement rendered more stringent in 
recent years by a string of opinions narrowly construing those terms.169  
Further, Monell liability facially excludes whole categories of potential 
injuries—including those committed by individual officers acting in 
disregard of local policy—that still merit redress and deterrence.  Because it 
cannot create law governing such individualized behavior, and because it is 
available only in rare circumstances even for practices that it arguably 
ought to cover,170
2.  Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief 
 municipal liability is incapable of performing the role 
currently occupied by § 1983 and Bivens litigation. 
These methods of constitutional elaboration have been widely and 
persuasively criticized as proposed substitutes for § 1983 and Bivens 
litigation.  Although Justice Kennedy identifies Citizens United v. FEC171 
and McDonald v. City of Chicago172 as cases exemplifying the possibility 
of such relief,173 it is difficult to imagine how plaintiffs would achieve 
standing to request such remedies when dealing with the kinds of violations 
most commonly alleged in constitutional tort litigation (for example, police 
misconduct and harassment).  Unlike political lobbying groups confronting 
a federal regulator, or a plaintiff carefully chosen to bring impact litigation 
against long-standing city policies, victims of police abuse are rarely 
forewarned about their pending constitutional injuries.  And even when they 
enjoy such foreknowledge, the Lyons requirement that they show a 
reasonable probability of once again being subjected to the alleged harm 
frequently constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to standing.174
3.  Suppression 
 
The defensive assertion of constitutional rights at suppression hearings 
triggered by criminal prosecutions is deficient in two respects: 
First, and most important, certain kinds of constitutional injuries 
infrequently result in the prosecution of victims and would therefore be 
inadequately addressed by suppression hearings.  As Dean Jeffries explains, 
 
 168. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 694 (1978). 
 169. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 394–95 (1989); City of St. Louis v. 
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988). 
 170. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011); see also The Supreme 
Court, 2010 Term—Leading Cases, Scope of Municipal Liability, 125 HARV. L. REV. 331 
(2011). 
 171. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 172. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 173. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2044 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 174. See Jeffries, supra note 58, at 132–33 (“A plaintiff has to show not merely that the 
defendant is engaged in unconstitutional conduct likely to cause identifiable future harm, but 
rather that foreseeable future misconduct will injure this plaintiff individually.”). 
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these cases “include what is arguably the greatest challenge in all the law of 
constitutional remedies—inhibiting the abusive and excessive use of force 
by law enforcement . . . [and] searches and arrest not aimed at successful 
prosecution, but rather at the assertion of police authority or (what may be 
perilously close to the same thing) police harassment.”175
Second, constitutional law forged in the crucible of criminal trials will 
look very different than law crafted in civil litigation.  Professor Greabe 
describes the exclusionary rule as a sword of Damocles in this context,
 
176 
echoing another commentator’s fear that “judges do not like excluding 
bloody knives, so they distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth Amendment 
was not really violated.”177  Professor Daryl Levinson has captured this 
relationship between rights and remedies under the heading of remedial 
deterrence:  “We should expect that raising the ‘price’ of a constitutional 
violation by enhancing the remedy will, all things being equal, result in 
fewer violations.  The primary method available to courts for lowering the 
number of violations is to pare back the constitutional right.”178
This focus on the institutional context in which rights are elaborated 
suggests that the substitution of criminal law for civil litigation would 
powerfully affect the scope of constitutional rights.  For example, on one 
hand, Professor Jennifer Laurin has persuasively shown that “nominally 
identical criminal procedure rights take on different contours in the criminal 
and civil realms,” since judges dealing with Miranda, Brady, and 
suggestive identification claims regularly “limit[ ] the availability of civil 
relief for what would undoubtedly be deemed a constitutional violation in 
the criminal context.”
  Since 
exclusion in a criminal trial typically “costs” more than the articulation of a 
prospective rule in a § 1983 or Bivens suit, judges may think differently 
about finding new rights in light of each remedy, and thus take a narrower 
view while elaborating constitutional law in criminal cases. 
179  On the other hand, Professor Leong has recently 
demonstrated that “civil plaintiffs are more likely to succeed in advocating 
an expansive view of the Fourth Amendment than are their criminal 
counterparts.”180
The demonstrable inadequacy of these “alternative dynamics” as a source 
of constitutional elaboration may nevertheless fail to stop some members of 
  This civil/criminal divide suggests that criminal trials are 
not interchangeable with § 1983 with regard to rights-creation.  It also 
raises the possibility that abandonment of civil-side elaboration will 
produce a corpus of regulation poisoned by the shadow of an exclusionary 
rule that has no rightful place in shaping civil liability. 
 
 175. Id. at 135–36. 
 176. Greabe, supra note 163, at 433. 
 177. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 
(1994). 
 178. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 857, 889 (1999). 
 179. Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (2010). 
 180. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 91 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1719774 (emphasis added). 
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the Court from invoking them to justify abandonment of Pearson 
discretion.  If that were to happen, the inevitable result would be a 
damaging cutback in the creation of new rights and a shift toward 
regulations disfigured by exposure to the exclusionary rule.  The best path 
forward is therefore refinement of status quo doctrine, which represents a 
fundamentally reasonable, effective, and practical compromise between the 
need to elaborate new rights and the dangers of “bad” law.  That said, as we 
explain in the next section, minor reform could go a long way toward 
addressing the most forceful criticism of qualified immunity doctrine that 
remains post-Camreta:  strategic judging. 
D.  Structuring Discretion:  The Best Path Forward 
The status quo’s superiority to a modification that would strip courts of 
discretion to issue constitutional determinations after finding qualified 
immunity does not render it immune to criticism.  As we argued in Part I, 
Pearson discretion raises the troubling possibility that judges will feel 
free—or even incentivized—to act strategically when deciding whether to 
reach the merits.  Camreta took an important step toward addressing this 
issue, but more work remains to be done to structure Pearson discretion and 
thereby secure its legitimacy.  In this section, we suggest the outline of one 
possible reform to achieve this goal. 
Camreta has at least partially resolved the issue of the reviewability of 
decisions to reach the constitutional merits after granting qualified 
immunity.  It did so by glossing Pearson to limit discretion.  In Pearson, 
Justice Alito provided a litany of criticisms of the Saucier mandate, but 
touched only briefly on the reasons why a lower court might opt to decide 
the constitutional question where there is a finding of qualified 
immunity.181  Nevertheless, Pearson described the Saucier sequence as 
“often appropriate,” “often beneficial,” and, in the context of cases where 
qualified immunity is unavailable, “especially valuable.”182  Camreta, in 
contrast, suggests a presumption against following the Saucier protocol—
which it describes as “advantageous” only in “select circumstances.”183  
Conceding that the “regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the 
qualified immunity situation because it threatens to leave standards of 
official conduct permanently in limbo,”184 the opinion nevertheless insists 
that the Court’s “usual adjudicatory rules suggest that a court should forbear 
resolving . . . constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of 
deciding them.”185
 
 181. 555 U.S. at 234–36. 
  Camreta then describes Pearson’s litany of criticisms 
of the Saucier mandate as not just reasons for allowing courts to skip to the 
immunity question, but as “a range of circumstances in which courts should 
 182. Id. at 236. 
 183. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011). 
 184. Id. at 2024 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998)). 
 185. Id. at 2031 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 
445 (1988)). 
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address only the immunity question.”186
This new rule may prompt confusion because of Camreta’s lack of 
specificity in distinguishing between Pearson’s criticism of mandatory 
Saucier analysis and Pearson’s articulation of situations under which it is 
inappropriate to reach the merits after finding qualified immunity.  Because 
the Pearson Court was describing the reasons for its retreat from Saucier 
rather than articulating a standard or rule for when a court should reach the 
merits where the defendant is immune, Pearson does not set forth a clear 
test.  Indeed, upon closer scrutiny, several of the considerations mentioned 
in Pearson should not be incorporated into Camreta’s new limit on 
discretion—either because they would conflict with Camreta’s purpose of 
maintaining Pearson discretion or would exacerbate strategic behavior. 
  Henceforth, courts may interpret 
this language as justifying review and reversal of the decision to reach 
Saucier’s second step under the circumstances listed in Pearson. 
For example, concerns about “expenditure of scarce judicial resources” 
and “wast[ing] the parties’ resources” are omnipresent in any litigation and, 
if applied as a mandatory bar to reaching the merits, would effectively end 
Pearson discretion.187  These critiques are therefore best understood as 
focused solely on mandatory Saucier review, not the exercise of post-
Pearson discretion.  So too Pearson’s observations that “[t]he lower courts 
sometimes encounter cases in which the briefing of constitutional questions 
is woefully inadequate,” giving rise to “a risk of bad decisionmaking.”188
The new Camreta bar on reaching constitutional merits after finding 
immunity should therefore be understood to only incorporate Pearson’s 
discussion of four scenarios:  (1) cases where “the constitutional question is 
so fact-bound that the decision provides little guidance for future cases”; (2) 
cases where “it appears that the question will soon be decided by a higher 
court”; (3) cases where the constitutional issue rests “on an uncertain 
interpretation of state law”; and (4) cases where “the precise factual basis 
for the plaintiff’s claim or claims may be hard to identify.”
  If 
bad briefing were interpreted as a post-Camreta bar to reaching the merits, 
the risk of strategic behavior by parties aimed at preventing constitutional 
rulings would be significantly increased. 
189  The 
remainder of Pearson’s critique of Saucier is inapplicable either for the 
reasons stated above or because that critique provides little more than a 
general reason for courts to be reluctant to reach the merits after finding 
immunity.190
 
 186. Id. at 2032 (emphasis added). (describing Pearson’s criticisms of the Saucier 
mandate as “factors courts should consider” to determine whether to reach the merits 
question (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 236–42 (2009))). 
 
 187. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237. 
 188. Id. at 239. 
 189. Id. at 238–39. 
 190. For example, Pearson also discusses the avoidance canon, concerns about 
reviewability, and scenarios in which the judge fears that he or she will not devote sufficient 
care to the constitutional determinations. See id. at 238–41.  These considerations may 
inform the exercise of Pearson discretion, but it would be nonsensical to include them as an 
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Although Camreta’s new standard moves qualified immunity doctrine in 
the right direction by limiting opportunities for purely strategic use of 
Saucier, we favor a more formalized standard to structure the discretion of 
the lower courts.  We believe that appellate courts ought to provide for 
review, under an abuse of discretion standard, of the decision to “reach[ ] 
beyond an immunity defense to decide a constitutional issue.”191
The principal determinant of a decision to reach the merits after finding 
qualified immunity ought to be the availability of adequate opportunities for 
constitutional elaboration elsewhere.  As we explained above, certain 
classes of § 1983 and Bivens constitutional injuries are particularly ill-
suited to development through alternative dynamics.  Moreover, requiring 
judges to explain why other vehicles of elaboration do not suffice will help 
to focus limited judicial resources on the class of claims most seriously in 
need of merits determinations.  In addition to this main consideration, our 
proposed standard of review would include such factors as the importance 
of the constitutional issue, the frequency with which it has been invoked or 
will likely be invoked again, and the extent to which government officials 
lack adequate guidance from circuit law. 
  Under 
such a regime, courts would be required to set forth reasons supporting their 
exercise of discretion before using the Saucier protocol.  This decision 
would then be upheld only upon a showing that the court had an adequate 
reason for doing so.  This approach would operate within the significant 
post-Camreta remainder of judicial discretion to create a measure of 
regularity and uniformity.  It would also help to cabin the potential for 
strategic behavior described and criticized in Part I. 
This approach borrows from Dean Jeffries’s more radical proposal to 
disaggregate constitutional tort law by recognizing that the Court’s 
“unified-field theory of qualified immunity” was partially broken by 
Camreta and would benefit from further disaggregation at the second step 
of discretionary Saucier.192  Whereas Dean Jeffries champions the creation 
of different qualified immunity defenses for different kinds of violations,193
 
absolute bar to reaching the constitutional merits because doing so would effectively end the 
discretion that Camreta clearly assumes it is preserving. 
 
we emphasize that different kinds of alleged violations merit different 
treatment with respect to Pearson discretion because allied doctrines of 
municipal liability, suppression, and injunctive relief vary in their success at 
securing constitutional elaboration.  A standard of review that incorporates 
this insight could focus discretion toward achieving the underlying purposes 
of Pearson discretion while also limiting strategic behavior.  A further 
advantage of this approach is that it would facilitate intelligent discussion 
between the judge and parties regarding the appropriateness of a 
constitutional ruling in the event that the defendant is found to enjoy 
qualified immunity.  These benefits are worth the cost of requiring judges 
 191. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2032. 
 192. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 264 
(2000). 
 193. See id. at 279–86. 
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who decline to reach the merits to explain that decision, however briefly, in 
anticipation of potential appellate review—particularly in light of our legal 
system’s norm disfavoring unaccountable discretion when dealing with 
important constitutional questions. 
CONCLUSION 
In a series of cases stretching across Harlow, Saucier, Pearson, and 
Camreta, the Court has fashioned a procedural framework that empowers 
courts to regulate public officials by deciding the merits of constitutional 
claims even as they extend qualified immunity to official conduct that does 
not violate a clearly established right.  Many of the most serious criticisms 
of this regime that remained after Pearson have been resolved by Camreta.  
Nevertheless, potent forces have begun to align against allowing any merits 
determinations in cases where the defendant has qualified immunity.  Thus, 
the survival of Pearson discretion—which is of vital importance to the 
development of constitutional law that protects individual rights and defines 
the limits of official power—may be in jeopardy unless the Court reaffirms 
its commitment to robust mechanisms of constitutional elaboration and 
refines the rules governing judicial discretion.  Such refinements may help 
reassure critics and secure the fundamentally workable status quo against 
those who would abandon constitutional elaboration to a dangerously 
inadequate set of alternative procedures.  As the Court stares into permanent 
limbo, and is urged by some of its members that all will be fine if it steps 
into that abyss, we hope that it chooses wisely. 
  
